FEDERAL SUPREMACY IN THE REGULATION
OF NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHERE DO
PUNITIVE DAMAGES LIE?
The advent of nuclear power has not been without its legal and
political fallout.' Congressional failure to delineate the extent to
which the states may involve themselves in the regulation of nuclear
energy 2 is one manifestation of this problem. In the wake of this
legislative shortcoming, the issue of the amplitude of damages recoverable by a party injured as a result of a nuclear incident, remains
uncertain. 3 This apparent gap in legislative planning was exposed in a
4
recent Tenth Circuit court decision, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
Notwithstanding its unresolved factual disputes, 5 Silkwood is an excellent vehicle by which to analyze the impact of federal regulation of
the nuclear industry, specifically the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,6 on
the available state remedies for tortious conduct. This Comment will
focus on an injured party's right to a punitive damage award 7 in the
context of a nuclear incident. Emphasis will be placed on ascertaining

Judicial opinions are scattered throughout the field of nuclear energy touching many
different aspects and issues. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (licensing of nuclear reactors); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(impact of National Environmental Policy Act on Atomic Energy Commission); Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972)
(preemption of state regulation concerning radioactive hazards); Marshall v. Consumers Power
Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975) (states' tenth amendment reservation of powers
to regulate nonradioactive hazards implied through § 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act). The
committee responsible for the promulgation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§
2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), recognized that the courts would be called on to define the
Act's scope. See Nothern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1156 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Hearingson Federal-StateRelations Before the Joint Comm.
on Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, 306-08 (1959) (testimony of Robert Lowenstein, AEC, Office of the General Counsel).
2 See Comment, State Regulation of Nuclear Power Production: Facing the Preemption
Challenge From a New Perspective, 76 Nw. L. REv. 134 (1981).
3 See Comment, Implied Preemption of Punitive Damages for Nuclear Accidents, 29 AM.
U.L. REv. 741 (1980).
' No. 79-1894 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981).
5 See supra notes 10 & 13.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
7 The availability of punitive damages depends upon the forum state. While criteria differ
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they are generally awarded where the defendant's wrongful
conduct was willful, wanton, or done in reckless disregard of the consequences. See Belli,
PunitiveDamages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC
L. Rev. 1 (1980).
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the extent to which such an award may be preempted by the existence
of a national regulatory scheme.
SILKWOOD V.

KE.R-McGCE CORP.

Karen Silkwood was employed by defendant, Kerr-McGee, as a
laboratory analyst. 8 On November 5, 6, and 7, 1974, Silkwood suffered radioactive contamination as a result of exposure to plutonium,
a radioactive chemical element.9 Subsequent to her death in an unrelated incident,' 0 the administrator of Silkwood's estate instituted a
diversity action for personal injuries in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma." The jury awarded the
plaintiff $500,000 for personal injuries,' 2 $5,000 in property damages,' 3 and $10,000,000 in punitive damages.' 4 These damage awards
were sustained despite defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial.1 5 KerrMcGee had contended, inter alia, that the federal regulatory scheme
controlling the nuclear industry preempted an award of punitive
damages and that compliance with the national regulations immunized defendant from any form of liability. " The district court dismissed these allegations and upheld the damage awards under state
7
tort law principles.'
On defendant's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in a two to one decision, sustained plaintiff's award

8 Silkwood, slip op. at 3.
1 Id. It was stipulated that the plutonium originated from the Kerr-McGee plant. During
the litigation, the precise method and time frame of exposure was hotly contested. These issues
are not germane to the subject of this Comment, therefore discussion of them will not be
included.
10 Karen Silkwood died in an automobile accident while on her way to meet a newspaper
reporter and a union leader. The accident was not a subject of the litigation Id. at 2, 7.
1 Id. at 1-2.
2 Id. This award was for plaintiffs mental anguish, i.e., fear and anxiety suffered due to the
plutonium exposure. Id.
13 Id. The property damage occurred in Karen Silkwood's apartment due to some radioactive
contamination found there. How the radioactive material passed from the Kerr-McGee plant to
Silkwood's home remains unresolved. Id.
14 Id. Exemplary damages were apparently awarded by the jury because of the reckless
indifference with which Kerr-McGee trained its employees and monitored its plant. Id. at 2, 27.
Is Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 570 (W.D. Okla. 1979), afJ'd in part
and rev'd in part, No. 79-1894 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981).
16 Id. at 571-72. The district court reasoned that an industry was not immunized from
liability for conduct for which the federal government did not impose liability. Compliance with
government safety regulations is a consideration, but is not dispositive of the liability issue. Id.
17 Id. at 572, 577-80, 594.
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for property damage,' 8 but reversed the personal injury award19 and
the award of punitive damages. 20 In dismissing plaintiffs punitive
damage award, the court of appeals adopted the defendant's claim
that such a judgment was preempted by the Federal Government's
exclusive regulation of radiation hazards. 2' The basis of the court's
reasoning was the seminal decision in the field of nuclear energy
regulation, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,22 which read the
Atomic Energy Act of 195423 as preempting any state regulation of
radiation hazards associated with the construction and operation of
nuclear facilities. The Northern States decision, basically a declaratory judgment action, 24 concentrated on section 274 of the Act, which
was intended to define the role of the states regarding nuclear energy
regulation. 25 The Silkwood court extended this rationale by applying
it to a remedial situation, stating that Northern States mandated
federal preemption of punitive damages due to their regulatory effect. 2 1
Defining punitive damages as an award " 'against a person to
punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others
like him from similar conduct in the future,' "27 the court of appeals
concluded that such a judgment accomplished the same obtrusive
result as if the state legislature had enacted stricter regulations in the
area of radiation hazards. 28 Reasoning that the states had been pre-

" Silkwood, slip op. at 22-26. The property damage award was upheld on the theory that it
constituted a legitimate compensable claim under state tort law. It was reasoned that such an
award did not run afoul of the purpose or intent of the federal regulatory policy, specifically the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Silkwood, slip op. at 3-21. The personal injury award was reversed on the grounds that a
provision of the Oklahoma Worker's Compensation Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West
1970 & Supp. 1980), provided exclusive liability against the employer, thereby precluding the
pursuance of an independent personal injury action. Silkwood, slip op. at 11-21.
20 Silkwood, slip op. at 26-30.
21

Id.

447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afJ'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). The issue posed was
"whether the United States Government has the sole authority under the doctrine of pre-emption
22

to regulate radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants to the exclusion of the states."
Id. at 1144. Responding to this query affirmatively, the court interpreted § 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 as impliedly preempting any state regulation with respect to radioactive
hazards. Id. at 1148-52. See also infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
24 447 F.2d at 1144.
215See Interpretation by the General Counsel: AEC Jurisdiction Over Nuclear Facilities and
Materials Under the Atomic Energy Act, 10 C.F.R. § 8.4(c) (1981).
20 Silkwood, slip op. at 29.
27 Id. at 27 (quoting RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979)).
22 Silkwood, slip op. at 29.
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45

cluded from so legislating, 2 the court held that a punitive damage
award, because of its deterring effect, was thereby preempted. 30 The
repercussions of Silkwood may be far-reaching, 31 although the decision itself may be subject to criticism as being analytically unsound.
The frailty lies in the fact that the court took large inferential steps in
reaching its conclusion, 32 thus leaving substantial logical gaps in its
reasoning. 33 It is necessary, therefore, to clarify those grey areas by
examining the role of punitive damages in the current preemption
setting. 34 This analysis must then be imposed on the national regulatory scheme of the nuclear industry to determine its preemptive effect.
FEDERAL SUPREMACY AND ITS APPLICATION
TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. An Overview of the Preemption Doctrine
The preemption doctrine stems from the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution, 35 which in essence states that laws promulgated by the Federal Government are "the supreme Law of the
Land." 3 Balancing this broad grant of federal supremacy is the tenth
amendment's reservation of states' rights and powers in areas not
specifically designated federal. 37 To gain an understanding of the
219Id. at 28-29. The appellate court's reasoning was based on the language of subsection

274(1) of the 1954 Act and on the Northern States decision. Id.
30 Id. at 26-30.
31 See Belli, supra note 7, at 4, noting that almost every state permits recovery for exemplary
damages, the exceptions being Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington. The Silkwood decision may affect punitive damage awards against other industries, such as the aviation
and drug industries, which are heavily regulated by the federal government.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 195-232.
33 See infra notes 195-243 and accompanying text presenting the proposition that the court of
appeals left the reader to draw too many inferences by failing to supply authoritative documentation, or simply not covering an area in sufficient detail.
34 See infra notes 102-45 and accompanying text. One commentator has proposed that
although it is difficult to place Supreme Court decisions regarding preemption in a tidy,
categorical scheme, it is quite helpful to view the Court's attitude towards preemption within
certain time frames. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624 (1975).
's U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl.2 states:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
id.
U.S. CONST. amend. X. The amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
36
"
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mechanics of the doctrine, i.e., when its invocation is desirable, it is
useful to analyze the character of the state regulation involved. 38 The
further a state regulation deviates from protecting those persons
within its borders, the less lenient the courts will be in permitting such
activity where federal legislation also governs. 39 When, however, a
state has exercised its police power to protect the health and safety of
its citizens, the judiciary will be hard-pressed to reach a preemptive
verdict. 40 Therefore, recognition of the state interest involved is a key
consideration in the issue of the preemption of punitive damages since
4
this has traditionally been a valid exercise of a state's police power. 1
Once the character of the state regulation has been evaluated, the
federal interest in the particular field must be ascertained. This is
accomplished by examining the face of the federal enactment in conjunction with its legislative history. 42 Such an inquiry is required to
determine the breadth of the federal statute and the extent to which
43
Congress has sought to occupy a specific area.
Initial investigation should be directed to any language in the
statute constituting an express preclusion of state involvement or an
"express saving" clause immunizing state action from any preemptive

respectively, or to the people." Id.; see also Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App.
237, 243, 237 N.W.2d 266, 273 (1975) (discussing interplay between supremacy clause and tenth
amendment).
38 See Note, A Framework or Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
11 Id. The author states that:
Laws that protect the people inside state borders from physical injury have received
the greatest deference from the Court. Laws that protect the people inside state
borders from other dangers have received less deference. State laws that purport to
protect people mostly outside state borders have received little deference.
Id. at 363. The above distinction is especially important in an analysis of punitive damages since
the state is attempting to protect the welfare of its citizens injured within its borders. See Rogers
v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971); infra notes 212 & 213 and accompanying text.
4o See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); Comment, supra note 2, at 141, 162;
Note, supra note 38, at 363, 374-79.
41 See supra note 39.
42 See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65
Mich. App. 237, 243-44, 237 N.W.2d 266, 273-74 (1975). See generally Note, supra note 38.
43 E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). The Court stated
"'that federal regulation . . . should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the
absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakenly so ordained." Id. at 142; see also
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
In this initial inquiry into the federal statute it should also be determined if Congress has
legislated within one of its constitutional powers. See Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1146; Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947) (grain storage facilities involved in
interstate commerce within federal domain under commerce clause).
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effect. 44 An express congressional directive adopting one of these
modes leaves little doubt as to the intent of Congress. 45 Absent such a
declaration that either precludes or preserves state legislation, further
inquiry should include a determination as to whether it is physically
impossible to adhere to both the national and state regulations.46
Where observance of a state enactment requires a violation of a
federal standard or negates opportunities furnished by the national
scheme, the state law must yield. 47 Lastly, where neither an express
congressional directive exists nor is compliance with both schemes
physically impossible, the courts may imply federal preemption. 48
When applying an implied preemption analysis the courts consider
several factors: the federal legislation and its history; 49 the comprehensiveness and pervasiveness of the national regulatory design; 50 the
character of the federal legislation and the need for national uniformity; 5' and whether the state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
52
Congress."
With this background of the preemption doctrine in mind, it is
necessary to examine how the courts have applied these guidelines
both in the past and in the present. Specific attention will be directed
44 See Note, supra note 38, at 363-66. "Express preemption occurs when a national statute
expressly forbids state regulation of a certain type or expressly requires that national regulation
be exclusive. Express saving is present when a national statute expressly forbids courts to preempt
state laws." Id. at 363; see also Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 243-44,
237 N.W.2d 266, 273-74 (1975).
11 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963). The courts have
required a "clear and unambiguous" congressional directive in order to find express preemption
of state law by the federal enactment. Id.; see also New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublin, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973); Note, supra note 38, at 364-65.
16 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Northern States,
447 F.2d at 1146.
47 Hirsch, Toward a New View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 530-31, 54851; Note, supra note 38, at 366-69.
48 Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1146; Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237,
244, 237 N.W.2d 266, 274 (1975).
11 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-50 (1963); Northern States,
447 F.2d at 1146.
10 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947): Northern States, 447 F.2d at
1146.
51 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963); Northern States,
447 F.2d at 1146.
51 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
561 (1973); Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1147.
It must be noted that within the past decade the importance and persuasiveness of the
considerations cited have been questioned, and to some extent, limited. See Note, supra note 34,
at 623; infra notes 66-99 and accompanying text.
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to the recent trend of the Supreme Court when confronted with a
53
preemptive issue.
B. Changing Attitude Toward Preemption
While it is recognized that a precise preemptive formula cannot
be developed, 54 a survey of Supreme Court decisions over the past
55
years reveals identifiable trends in the interpretation of the doctrine.
Generally, the Court has vacillated between an enthusiastic promo56
tion of state interests and a more federally directed approach.
Protection of state interests was the dominant concern during the
1930's.5 7 During this period, the Court required a definite and clear
congressional declaration that federal regulation was to be exclusive,
otherwise the state legislation would stand. 58 In 1941, however, with
the decision of Hines v. Davidowitz,5 9 the era of states' rights subsided. 60 Applying a preemption analysis, the Court in Hines departed
from its past use of the "intent standard" 61 and invoked a ratiocination
which considered the comprehensiveness of the federal scheme along
with the need for a national, uniform policy. 62 Re-examining the
judiciary's role when confronted with a preemption issue, the Court
declared that the state law must fall where it "stands as an obstacle to

5" See infra notes 66-99 and accompanying text.
m Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (court cannot create "an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick .. .there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula"); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973)
(preclusion of state law is judged on case-by-case basis, turning "on the peculiarities and special
features of the regulatory scheme in question").
11 See Note, supra note 34, at 623; Comment, supra note 2, at 138-42; infra notes 66-99 and
accompanying text.
51 Note, supra note 34, at 626.
11 Id. at 626-27.
-" See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); H. P. Welsh Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933); see also Note,
supra note 34, at 627, where the author states, "[a]bsent an 'actual conflict' between federal and
state law, preemption could only occur if congressional intent to occupy the field was 'definitely
and clearly' shown." Id.
,1 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Hines involved the interplay between the Alien Registration Act, ch.
439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (amended 1952), and a Pennsylvania act which imposed more elaborate
criminal penalties upon an alien's failure to possess a registration card. 312 U.S. at 59.
o See Note, supra note 34, at 630-32; Comment, supra note 2, at 141-42.
6l The term "intent standard" is used here to refer to the clear congressional intent required
to sustain a preemptive judgment absent a "physical impossibility." Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141, 146 (1963); see Note, supra note 34, at 626-27; Comment,
supra note 2, at 141-42. See generally L. TRUBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-4 (1978).
62 312 U.S. at 66-67.
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the full purposes and objectives of Congress." '6 3 This instruction had
the
the effect of lowering the preemptive threshold, thus granting
64
Court almost a free hand in striking down state legislation.
As the 1970's approached, this "federal-directed" application of
the preemption doctrine arose in a variety of circumstances. 65 In 1973,
however, the Court in Goldstein v. California6 6 apparently de-emphasized this near blind application of federal supremacy. 67 Citing the
broad language of Hines as the proper inquiry, 68 the national statute
was narrowly construed thereby failing to preempt the state law. 69
Close attention was devoted to the concept of federalism as espoused
by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, 70 and by Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden. 7' The Court, adopting the language of
Hamilton, stated that when reconciling state and federal regulations
and
the state statute must be "absolutely and totally contradictory
72 to the federal scheme for preemption to apply. 73
repugnant"

Id. at 67.
Note, supra note 34, at 633, 635-36. "The adoption of a potential conflict standard
accented the drift toward a federal-directed preemption doctrine, by beckoning judicial consideration of a federal statute's operational requirement and inviting preemption on speculative
assessments of conflict." Id. at 636.
65 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (copyright clause);
Farmers Educ. and Coop. Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (federal
communications law); San Diego Bldg. Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 276 (1959) (labor
relations law); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (anti-sedition laws); Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (regulation of licensed warehouse under federal act); see
also Note, supra note 34, at 630-39.
While the court deviated from the federal-directed approach in isolated instances, see, e.g.,
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), this ideology dominated into the 1970's. See infra notes 6699 and accompanying text.
66 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
67 Note, spro note 34, at 639.
63
64

, See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

66 412 U.S. at 561. The contention raised by petitioner was that the federal copyright power

precluded state legislation in the field. Id. at 563.
" - 'It is not . . . a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an
immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a preexisting right of [state] sovereignty.' " 412 U.S. at 554-55 (quoting TnE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 243
(A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961)).
7' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
The genius and character of the federal government seem to be, that its action is to
be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns
which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a
particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary
to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.
Id., quoted in Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 554.
72 412 U.S. at 553.
73 Id.
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In keeping with this renewed outlook on the protection of state
interests, the Court in New York State Department of Social Services
v. Dublino74 upheld a state program which imposed stricter standards
on welfare recipients than the federal law. 7 5 More importantly, the
Court rejected the appellee's contention that the federal scheme was
so pervasive as to preclude any state regulation . 76 Coupled with the
requirement that the state law be totally repugnant to the national
policy as enunciated in Goldstein,77 the Dublino decision manifests a
volition to return to a sympathetic, state-directed approach 78 while
7
substantially disarming an implied preemption analysis .
This state-directed approach was again followed in Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware.8 0 The Court, stating
that a fine balance exists between state and federal regulation,8 1 upheld a state statute that forbade practices which acted as a restraint on
trade.8 2 To maintain such a conclusion, the proper approach is "to
reconcile 'the operation of both statutory schemes with one another
rather than holding one completely ousted.' "83 The Ware decision
accented the need for explicit congressional directives when employ-

" 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
75
71

Id.
Id. at 415.

The subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature
require intricate and complex responses from Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the problem. Given
the complexity of the matter . . . a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and
appropriate, completely apart from any questions of pre-emptive intent.
Id. (citation omitted). The Court further stated that the legislative history cited to support the
implied preemptive finding was insufficient basis for such a decision. Id. at 417.
11 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
78 Note, supra note 34, at 645. The language in Dublino stressed that: 1) federal preemption
should not be applied in a wholesale manner; and 2) a clear congressional directive is necessary.
413 U.S. at 413.
Emphasis was also placed on the consideration that state programs, such as the one in
question, existed prior to the enactment of the federal legislation. It was reasoned that Congress,
being aware of such programs, would have expressly preempted them had it intended to do so.
Id. at 414, 420.
79 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text & infra note 193 and accompanying text.
80 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
81 The California statute invalidated " 'every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind. ' " Id. at 121 (quoting CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964)). The validity of this statute was sustained over petitioners
claim that it conflicted with the New York Stock Exchange rules promulgated pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 414 U.S. at 119, 121-22, 125.
82 414 U.S. at 127.
83 Id. (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). The Silver
decision involved two conflicting federal statutory schemes. While it presented a different
factual make-up from Ware, it presented a proper "analytical framework." 414 U.S. at 125-26.
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51

ing a preemptive analysis in an area where a state has otherwise
validly exercised its police power.8 4 The rationale of Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,8 5 requiring "persuasive reasons" for
the courts to preempt a state regulation, 86 was cited with approval by
87
the Ware Court.
Reiterating its policy regarding state interests, the Court in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.88 reconciled a state trade secret law
with the national patent policy.8 In sustaining the validity of the state
act, the Hines criteria was again cited as the proper supremacy clause
standard. 90 In so doing, the Court further clarified its apparent deference to state interests, stating that a mere possibility that conflicts
between the two schemes could be fabricated was insufficient to
validate a preemptive finding.9 ' It thus recognized that a degree of
2
conflict would be tolerated absent a showing of actual conflict.
Again conforming to this flexible state interest approach,
DeCanas v. Bical 3 sustained a California law which imposed sanc-

84 Id. at 134-35. The Court stated that the areas touched by the state legislation were merely
peripheral to the purpose and scope of the federal regulatory scheme. Id. The federal statute had
provided for self-regulation in the area of securities laws, thereby permitting state participation
in the regulatory plan. Considering this the Court stated, - [w]here the Government has
provided for collaboration the courts should not find conflict. " Id. at 137 (quoting Union
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 209 (1944)).
" 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
86 Id. at 142. See supra note 43.
87 414 U.S. at 139; see also Note, supra note 34, at 649.
88416 U.S. 470 (1974).
89 Id.
80 Id. at 479. Hines, which espoused a broad basis for a preemptive finding, stated that a
state law should not stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." 312 U.S. at 67.
11 Specifically, the Court stated, "[i]n the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of
deterrence from patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents
exists." 416 U.S. at 489. The rationale was based on the language in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), which directed the attention of the judiciary to the issue of
whether the state involvement appeared to be " 'too great an encroachment on the federal patent
system to be tolerated.' " 416 U.S. at 482 (quoting id. at 232).
82 See 416 U.S. at 489-91; see also Note, supra note 34, at 646-47.
The need to uphold state interests where a mere possibility of a conflict can be fabricated
was also recognized in Goldstein. There the Court stated that "[w]e must also be careful to
distinguish those situations in which the concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government and the States, or by the States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations
where conflicts will necessarily arise." 412 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added). The Court acknowledged that our governmental system promotes possible conflicts and that every potentiality
should not call for the invocation of federal preemption. Id. at 558; see also Marshall v.
Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 253, 237 N.W.2d 266, 282; Note, supra note 34, at
650.
83 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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tions on employers of illegal aliens over, objections that the Federal
Government had reserved exclusive control over the regulation of
immigration. 94 The argument that the national enactment was so
comprehensive that it necessarily precluded any form of state regulation was rejected as in Dublino.95 The Court emphasized that a "clear
and manifest purpose of Congress" must be demonstrated to preempt
any state involvement. 96
The state-directed preemption concept, apparently resurrected in
Goldstein,97 gained momentum through 1976 with the Dublino,
Ware, Kewanee Oil, and DeCanas decisions.9 8 The refusal to invalidate state legislation unless Congress evidences a clear, preemptive
intent has come to be identified as a characteristic of the Burger
Court.9 9 The application of such a preemptive doctrine, in the context
of punitive damages, should be thoroughly scrutinized, carefully
weighing the competing policies and interests involved.
C. Damage Awards in a Preemptive Setting
An appreciation of legitimate state interests is important in a
discussion of damage awards, 0 0 for in applying a preemptive analysis
to an award of punitive damages, the courts are dealing with a
traditional state remedial power. 10 1
Inspection of the treatment of punitive damages in a preemptive
setting discloses the possible precedential impact of the Silkwood decision. The concept equating punitive damages with state regulatory
action because of their deterrent effect, has rarely been discussed. 10 2

Id.
91Id. at 359-60. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
96 424 U.S. at 357. The federal regulation was inspected on its face, along with its legislative
background, for "any specific indication- that Congress had precluded any attempt at state
legislation. Id. at 358.
97 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
"I See Comment, supra note 2, at 157-61; Note, supra note 34, at 653.
100The court of appeals in Silkwood failed in this respect. They neglected in their written
opinion to: 1) inspect adequately the legislative history of the entire Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
2) emphasize the distinction between a mere possibility of conflict and actual conflict; 3) identify the current purpose behind the development of nuclear energy; and 4) reconcile the two
schemes due to their qualitative differences instead of completely ousting one. See infra notes
196-244 and accompanying text.
101 See infra text accompanying notes 212 & 213.
191 Only two Supreme Court decisions have been uncovered that mentioned the issue whether
a damage award was preempted as a form of state regulation. The cases are: UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634, 650 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242, 246-47 (1957). See injra text accompanying notes 103-07 for a
discussion of these decisions.
94
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In the dissenting opinion in UAW v. Russell,10 3 Chief Justice Warren
espoused his fear that a punitive damage award constituted the type of
regulation forbidden by the congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the National Labor Relations Board. 104 A similar concern was
opined by the majority in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon.'0 5 In a five to four decision, the Court reasoned that the
power to award damages can be used to discourage or prevent certain
conduct and therefore should be precluded by the NLRB's sole jurisdiction over the field. 10 6 So, while the fairly novel assertion that an
award of punitive damages constitutes a form of state regulation has
received some endorsement, it has not by any means found general
of Garmon have
acceptance. In fact, the rationale and language
07
rarely been cited to support such a proposition.1
While few courts have expressly stated that a punitive damage
award constitutes state regulation, the issue of their availability has
arisen in a federal regulatory setting on a number of occasions. 0 8 The
courts have generally ascertained the overall purpose of the federal
statutory scheme and then determined whether a punitive damage
award would be consistent with that purpose.I0 Although an ad hoc
preemption approach has been applied to damage awards, 10 some
basic principles can be ascertained and applied to this analysis.

Punitive damages, however, have been rejected in certain instances because they were not
consistent with the purposes behind the federal policy. E.g.. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
03 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
104 Id. at 650-53.
0s 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
106Id. at 246-47. Specifically, the Court stated:
Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from state
regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive
relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States' salutary effort
to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to
regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory
scheme.
Id.
107 The Supreme Court has never recited this language. Even in the court of appeals decision
in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S.
290 (1976), the court, stating in dictum that the deterrent effect of punitive damages constitutes
impermissible regulation, failed to cite Garmon or any other authority in support of its proposition. See Comment, supra note 3, at 759-62.
108See infra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
109See infra notes 110-45 and accompanying text.
1"0See supra notes 102-07 & infra notes 110-45 and accompanying text.
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In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp.,"' the issue
was whether, under a common law tort action, a victim of an unfair
labor practice could recover both compensatory and punitive damages, despite the National Labor Relations Board's presence in that
area."12 Recognizing that exemplary damages are traditionally a valid
exercise of a state's police power, the state court's award of punitive
damages was upheld." 3 In discussing the proper preemptive analysis,
the Court stated that a valid exercise of state power should only be
precluded "where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive'
that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together.' "114 Interestingly, the Court noted that the national scheme
failed to provide an1 5alternative remedial plan for "injuries caused by
tortious conduct."
Repeating the argument raised in Laburnum, the appellant in
UAW v. Russell"16 objected to an award of punitive damages, alleging
that the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction regarding unfair labor practices
dictated their preclusion." 7 Rejecting petitioner's contention and
quoting Laburnum, the Court recognized that although a potential
for conflict existed, it was insufficient to warrant a preemptive finding."I The punitive damage award was sustained on the basis that an
injured party has all available state remedies at his disposal, absent a
clear congressional directive. " 9
2
While commentators,12 0 and in one decision the Court itself,' '
have attempted to narrowly interpret the holdings of Laburnum and

1" 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
112 Id. at 657, 658-59, 663.
13 Id. at 663-65.
To the extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed a procedure for dealing
with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for
concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have
been eliminated . . . . The primarily private nature of claims for damages under
state law also distinguishes them in a measure from the public nature of the regulation of future labor relations under federal law.
Id. at 665.
"I Id. at 663 n.5 (quoting Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937)). This approach,
reconciling the competing regulatory schemes, is consistent with the current trend of the Supreme Court. The approach protects the state interest unless it is 1) repugnant to, or 2) actually
conflicts with, the federal regulation, or 3) Congress has clearly manifested an intent to preclude
such a state enactment. See supra notes 66-101 and accompanying text.
347 U.S. at 663-64.
"l
i16 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
117 Id.
11

"oId.
120
121

at 640.

356 U.S. at 644.
at 646.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 758.
See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247-49.
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Russell, the rationale of those decisions is still quite persuasive. Those
who have sought to confine the application of Russell and Laburnum
have focused on the violent or threatening conduct condemned in
both instances. 122 The Court's rationale in each case, however, should
not be so restricted. 23 For example, the decision in Laburnum, which
permitted a state exemplary award absent an alternative remedy or a
clear preclusion, has been cited in many non-violent situations. 124 The
Court's statement in Russell, that a mere possibility of a federal-state
conflict is insufficient to invoke a preemptive finding, should likewise
not be so confined.

2 5

Examining the availability of state remedies given the existence
of a national regulatory policy, the Court in Vaca v. Sipes 1 26 recog-

nized that traditional remedial schemes should not be preempted
where local interests are involved absent a congressional mandate, or
where a conflict merely touched upon the outer fringe of a federal
concern.127 Language to this effect has often been repeated by the
Court in support of state remedial powers. 128 One instance in which
the Court expressed a great concern for state interests was Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, 219 where the Court followed the view that a preexisting right is to be granted the utmost deference unless it renders the
federal enactment inoperative. 130 While Nader did not directly ad-

122 See id.

123 See id. at 249-54 (Harlan, J., concurring).
124 See, e.g., International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621-22 (1958);
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 477 (1955).
125 See spra note 121.
126 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
127 Id. at 180 (citing Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44). Vaca involved a suit by an employee
against his union for breach of its duty of representation in connection with the employee's
wrongful discharge allegation against his employer. Id. at 173. It was held, that the damages
awarded against the union for a violation of its duty of fair representation were improper. The
Court found that the employer, not the union, was principally responsible for the damages
claimed. Therefore, the award of compensatory and punitive damages against the union was
reversed. Id. at 195-98. The injured party's right, however, to seek punitive damages was not
foreclosed by the Court. After recognizing that the union was not the sole culprit, Justice White
stated that, "t~he appropriate remedy for a breach of a union's duty of fair representation must
vary with the circumstances of the particular breach." Id. at 195.
128 See id. at 180; see, e.g., Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (state remedies
applicable in libel action despite federal labor legislation); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (presence of federal labor legislation does not
preclude state jurisdiction regarding mass picketing).
.29 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
13 Id. at 298.

[A] common-law right, even absent a saving clause, is not to be abrogated 'unless it
be found that the preexisting right is so repugnant to the statute that the survival of
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dress the area of punitive damages, 13 1 its language is instructive.
2 Dublino,'3 3
Strong statements, such as those reiterated in Goldstein, 13
1 34
and DeCanas, were incorporated into the Nader discussion of the
application of a state's common law remedies.135
The Court's analysis in Nader also provides insight to when
possible conflict between a federal act and a common law remedy will
be tolerated. It was reasoned that in sustaining an application of a
state remedial scheme, the courts are not imposing their regulatory
judgments upon the federal policy, 136 but are merely allowing the
injured parties the right to seek redress for the wrongs committed,
outside the scope of the national law. 37 An after-the-fact redress for
injuries incurred must be distinguished from federal enactments regulating the operation of a particular industry. 13 Too much emphasis
should not be placed on the blind compliance with a federal regulatory scheme while the actual effects on the public go ignored.
In International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 3 9 the
above rationale was invoked in sustaining a damage award to a
former union member for illegal expulsion, over objections that such
an award interfered with the NLRB's implementation of national

such right would in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other
words, render its provisions nugatory.'
Id. (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907)).
Similar language can be found in Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237,
252, 237 N.W.2d 266, 281 (1975), where the court stated that a mere impingement upon the
federal act should not preclude the application of traditional state remedies.
131 426 U.S. at 296.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 66-73 for a discussion of Goldstein.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 74-79 for a discussion of Dublino.
-4 See supra text accompanying notes 93-99 for a discussion of DeCanas.
135 Specifically, the forceful expressions used by the Court were: 1) "repugnant," 2) "deprive
. ..of its efficacy," and 3) "render... nugatory." 426 U.S. at 298 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907)). This language is consistent with the state interest
presumption currently applied by the Court. See notes 66-101 and accompanying text; Dublino,
413 U.S. at 413 (requiring a "clear manifestation" of congressional intent, "federal supremacy is
not lightly to be presumed") (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)); DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 (requiring any specific indication of legislative intent); Kewanee Oil, 416
U.S. at 482 (whether the state act "constitutes 'too great an encroachment' "); Goldstein, 412
U.S. at 553 ("absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant").
"( 426 U.S. at 299.
137 Id.
"38See Rosadail v. Western Aviation, 297 F. Supp. 681, 683-84 (D. Colo. 1969) ("civil
remedies for damages as a means of enforcing the act were not envisioned by Congress");
Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 252, 237 N.W.2d 266, 281 (1975) (AEC
regulations applied to safe operation while state judicial remedies are "to insure the welfare of its
citizens"). See generally Annot., 82 A.L.R. 3d 729 (1978).
0356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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policy. 140 Noting the Board's power to grant what would amount to
partial relief, the Court refused to preclude the pursuance of a state
cause of action.' 4 ' Absent a compelling congressional declaration,
states will not be deprived of vindicating a party's right to damages,
scheme. 142 Both
even in the face of potential conflict with the federal
43
approvingly.'
Laburnum and Russell were cited
In assessing an individual's right to punitive damages, the courts
should take a tough stand against preempting such damage awards
since they constitute a traditional remedy under many state tort
laws.' 44 The courts should be aware that such a remedial power is
central to a state's protection of its citizens' welfare and tremendous
deference should be accorded the discharge of a state's police
power. 145
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS THEY RELATE
TO THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER

A. Atomic Energy Regulation
The birth of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), through the
promulgation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 146 (AEA), evidenced a
congressional intent to explore the use of nuclear power in the production of energy. 147 The Federal Government under the 1946 Act main144Id. The federal statute involved in Gonzales was the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976). Under the Act the NLRB was authorized to award back pay to a
victim of an unfair labor practice. It was not empowered to grant the relief provided for under
state law, sought in Gonzales for damages for breach of contract. 356 U.S. at 620-21.
620-21.
4

356 U.S. at 621.

Id. at 620, 621-22. " 'Although even these state court decisions may lead to possible conflict
between the federal labor board and state courts they do not present potentialities of conflicts in
kind or degree which require a hands-off directive to the states.' " Id. at 622 (quoting lsaacson,
Labor Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A. J. 415, 483 (1956)).
142

143 356 U.S. at 620-21.

144 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

[A] court, seeking a remedy to match [a] wrong, has at its disposal the full panoply of
tools traditionally used by courts to do justice between parties. Punitive damages,
being one of these tools, thus are presumptively available for use in appropriate
cases, unless Congress has directed otherwise.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 53 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
see also Belli, supra note 7, at 4-5, 23.
"I See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
146 Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, amended by Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat.
919.
'47 The purpose of the AEC under the 1946 Act was to coordinate the development of nuclear
weapons and to investigate the potential of atomic fission as an energy source. See Comment,
supra note 2, at 143; Frampton, Radiation Exposure-The Need for a National Policy, 10 STAN.
L. Rrv. 7, 17 (1957).
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tained a monopolistic ownership over the development, production,
48
and utilization of fissionable materials.
An in-depth study of nuclear development and its related problems began in 1952.149 Extensive hearings commenced in 1953150
which culminated in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.' 5 ' This Act
reflected the rapid technological advancement of nuclear power's use
for peaceful purposes 52 and incorporated congressional policy
changes encouraging private industries' participation in nuclear energy production.15 3 The Federal Government, however, was not willing to completely relinquish its firm grip on the industry, and therefore authorized the AEC to closely regulate nuclear facilities in the
private sector. '54 A licensing scheme was established requiring the
issuance of a permit by the AEC to the private enterprise before the
latter could utilize nuclear energy for commercial purposes. 55
One of the more crucial changes in the 1954 Act was the PriceAnderson Act (Price-Anderson),1 5 an amendment which was the
Government's response to the private sector's fear of unlimited liability in the face of a nuclear accident. 57 The crux of Price-Anderson

14'Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, §4(b), 60 Stat. 755, 759, amended by Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, § 41, 68 Stat. 919, 928; see also Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1147;
S. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SEev. 1327, 1331;
S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3456.
149 S. REP. No. 1699, supra note 148, at 5, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3456, 3460.
15 Id.
15' Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)).
152 S. REP. No. 1699, supra note 148, at 3-4, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3456, 3459. The 1954 Act permits the private sector to build, maintain and operate its own
nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2078 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
153 S. REP. No. 1699, supra note 148, at 2-4, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3456, 3457-59.
1'4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2132 (1976); Comment, supra note 3, at 745-46; Comment supra note 2, at
144.
In promulgating a regulatory policy, the AEC was to be "consistent with the common
defense and security and with the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976).
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (special nuclear material); id. §§ 2092, 2093
(source material); id. §§ 2111, 2112 (by-product material); id. §§ 2131-2140 (utilization and
production facilities). The above provisions represent the various licensing provisions under the
1954 Act. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers,
367 U.S. 396, 400-08 (1961) for an outline of the licensing procedure.
15' Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979)). The Price-Anderson Act was added as § 170 to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and has
been amended eight times. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
157 S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3201, 3206.
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was an insurance plan whereby AEC licensees were indemnified by
the Federal Government from liability in excess of their private insurance sources. 158 It set a limit of $560 million on the aggregate liability
for a single nuclear incident. 5 9 If an accident were to occur, PriceAnderson has left the applicable state tort law virtually unaltered. 1 0
In the event, however, of what is termed an "extraordinary nuclear
occurrence" (ENO), '1 1 Price-Anderson stipulates that particular fundamental defenses be waived for those licensees falling under the
indemnity and private source insurance requirements. 61 2 By enacting
this provision Congress sought to streamline the recovery process for
victims of an ENO, and to avoid conflicts involving the state tort law
application of strict liability. 16 3 Thus, Price-Anderson, absent an
ENO, maintains a claimant's right to pursue a cause of action under a

42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)-(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Price-Anderson requires those persons licensed by the Commission to obtain
as much private insurance as possible and to thereafter execute an indemnification agreement
with the government via the AEC to insure against claims which exceed the private coverage
limits. Id. § 2210(b), (c).
It should be noted that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has taken over the duties
of the AEC under the Energy Research and Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976).
11oS. REP., supra note 157, at 6, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3201, 3206.
Since its enactment by Congress in 1957 one of the cardinal attributes of the PriceAnderson Act has been its minimal interference with State law. Under the PriceAnderson system, the claimant's right to recover from the fund established by the act
is left to the tort law of the various states ....
Id. The language used when discussing the policies behind Price-Anderson are key to an analysis
of punitive damages. For it is the only section of the 1954 Act which speaks to the indemnification of injured parties under tort law principles. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text
discussing Price-Anderson and the reservation of state tort law rules.
16142 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The criteria defining an ENO is located in
10 C.F.R. §§ 140.81-85 (1982). Basically, to be classified as an ENO a nuclear incident must
cause a substantial discharge of radioactive materials resulting in substantial damage to persons
or property. Id. Substantial damage is defined as: 1) death or hospitalization to 5 or more persons
within 30 days of the incident; 2) $2.5 million or more in property damage suffered by any one
person, or $5 million or more of such damage in the aggregate; or 3) at least 50 persons each
sustain $5,000 or more in property damage and the aggregate of damage totals $1 million or
more. Id. § 140.85.
16242 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1976 & Supp. Il 1979). The Commission can require those
involved in the financial protection scheme to: "[W]aive (i) any issue or defense as to conduct of
the claimant or fault of persons indemnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or
governmental immunity, and (iii) any issue or defense based on any statute of limitations." Id.
158

159Id. § 2210(e).

103 S. REP,., supra note 157, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3201, 3206.

The number and geographical range of injuries which could result from an ENO, considered in
conjunction with the varying state attitudes toward strict liability, required Congress to devise a
plan accommodating the injured parties. Id.
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state's "traditional rules of tort law."'4 For this reason, it is basic to
6 5
an analysis of punitive damages.
In 1959, Congress again amended the 1954 Act by adding section
274.166 The purpose of this section was to delineate the role of the
states in cooperating with the national policy. 6 7 An understanding of
section 274 is important since it, coupled with the decision in Northern States, formed the basis for the court of appeals decision in Silkwood. 8
B. Section 274 and Northern States
Subsections 274(b), and (c)' 6 9 of the 1959 amendment provide for
"turn over" agreements between the Commission and the governor of
the state involved, regarding certain specified materials. 17 0 Subsection
274(b) allows the Commission to relinquish control to the state over
the regulation of certain types of by-product material,' 7 1 source materials, 172 and special nuclear materials in quantities insufficient to form
a critical mass. 173 The Government again, however, did not surrender

114 Id. at 11, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 3201, 3211. "In
essence, the
plan adopted permits the retention of State law with respect to the cause of action and the
measure of damages ....
" Id. at 9, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 3201,
3209; see also supra note 160.
"I Price-Anderson is virtually the only section of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that devotes
some discussion to liability principles to be applied following a nuclear incident. Price-Anderson
is critical when analyzing the possible preemption of an award of punitive damages as it defers to
the states their traditional tort law principles which embody the granting of such damages. See
infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text.
It is also noteworthy that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, when reviewing PriceAnderson, recognized that an injury could occur without anything out of the ordinary transpiring. The committee stated:
The inclusion of the "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" concept in the bill stems
in major part from the desire of industry to preserve its customary legal defenses in
situations where nothing untoward or unusual has occurred in the conduct of
nuclear activities.
S. Rse., supra note 157, at 11, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3201, 3211. From
this statement it may be inferred that an injury or claim could arise against a nuclear plant even
though no federal regulations had been violated.
161 Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 72 Stat. 688 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
2
167 42 U.S.C. § 021(a)(1) (1976); see Interpretation by the General Counsel:
AEC Jurisdiction Over Nuclear Facilities and Materials Under the Atomic Energy Act, 10 C.F.R. § 84(c)
(1981).
I'l See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
16' 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b), (c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
170 Id.
7! Id. § 2021(b)(1), (2).
IId.§ 2021(b)(3).
.1 Id. § 2021(b)(4).
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total control, retaining the power to terminate or suspend such agreements and to reinstate federal regulatory controls to protect the public
health and safety.' 7 4
A further limitation on the nature or content of such agreements
is found in subsection 274(c).1 75 This prohibits any turn over agreements which yield to the states the power to regulate the construction
and operation of any production or utilization facility, 76 export or
import of by-product, source or special nuclear materials, 7 the disposal of the above waste materials into the ocean or sea, 7 8 and the
disposal of other such materials.17 It was felt that the risks inherent in
these activities mandated the continued application of the Federal
80
Government's more sophisticated technology.
One other subsection which should be analyzed when attempting
to determine the state's posture in the field of nuclear energy is
274(k).' 8 1 It provides that "[n]othing in this section [274] shall be
construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to
regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards." 82 This subsection takes on increased significance when read
in light of its interpretation in Northern States and Silkwood. 8 3 The
court in Northern States placed heavy emphasis on the phrase " 'other
than protection against radiation hazards.' "184 This language, when
read in conjunction with the theory that the Government would not
have gone to the extent of promulgating federal-state cooperative
legislation if it did not believe it already had exclusive control of the
area, enabled the court to preempt Minnesota's attempted regulation
of radioactive releases. 18 In Silkwood this rationale was taken one

,74Id. § 2021(j).
"I Id. § 2021(c).
171

Id. § 2021(c)(1).

117

Id. § 2021(c)(2).

'8 Id. § 2021(c)(3).
'17 Id. § 2021(c)(4).
l"0 See JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 86TH CONG.,

1ST SESS., SELECTED

MATERIALS ON

FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD 3, 26 (Comm. Print 1959).
181 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
182 Id.

See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text & infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text
discussing Northern States' use of § 274(k) and Silkwood's reliance on the court's interpretation of
that provision in Northern States.
183

184

447 F.2d at 1149-50 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k)).
F.2d at 1150. "Unless the federal government possessed exclusive authority over

85 447

radiation hazards, the inclusion of the ['other than radiation hazards' language] would have been
meaningless and unnecessary." Id.
It was necessary for the court to go into a detailed analysis of the Atomic Energy Act and its
legislative history because it was unable to locate a form of express preemption. Id. at 1147.
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step further and applied to a punitive damage award as if it constituted a regulation of radiation hazards. 86 Thus, subsections 274(b),
(c), and (k), and their respective legislative histories, are fundamental
to punitive damage analysis because construction of these provisions
formed the basis of the Northern States decision which was later
87
expanded upon by the Silkwood court.
Northern States involved a requirement of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency that the Northern States Monticello plant conform to state radioactive effluent regulations. 88 The state standards in
fact imposed significantly more stringent release levels than those of
the AEC.189 Determining that neither an express prohibition against
such state legislation existed nor was compliance with both schemes 10
a physical impossibility, the court found that the Federal Government's role with respect to radiation hazard regulation was exclusive. 9 1 A state, therefore, is precluded from regulating radioactive
effluents in any manner, even to protect the health and welfare of its
citizens.19 2 Assuming, arguendo, that the analysis in Northern States is
still viable, 193 it is a tenuous proposition to extend this holding to
support the preemption of punitive damage awards.19 4 A step-by-step
analysis of the reasoning in Silkwood will aid in illustrating this
position. 15

See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
See Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1145; Silkwood, slip op. at 26-30. See infra notes 188-92
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Northern States decision.
's

"1 447
'IQ Id.
110 Id.
"I' Id.
192

F.2d at 1145.
at 1147.
at 1147-48.
at 1154.

Id.

The implied preemption analysis invoked by the Northern States court has been significantly diluted by recent developments in the nuclear field, and by the current state-directed
attitude of the Supreme Court toward preemption. For instance, the contention that a federal
statutory scheme is so pervasive as to preclude state involvement, relied on by Northern States,
447 F.2d at 1150, 1152-53, has been criticized by the Supreme Court. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at
359-60; Dublino, 413 U.S. at 415; supra notes 73-78 & 93-96 and accompanying text.
Another consideration in Northern States was the determined effort by Congress to promote
nuclear energy in the private sector by the 1954 Act. See 447 F.2d at 1154. Under the Energy
Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976), Congress took the promotional emphasis off
nuclear energy and directed it toward all energy sources. See COMMENT, supra note 2, at 154-71,
where the author discusses similar arguments limiting the underlying rationale of Northern
States.
194 See infra notes 196-244 and accompanying text.
195 See infra notes 196-232 and accompanying text. The court of appeals in Silkwood broke
down its analysis into four parts: 1) the Price-Anderson Act, which did not apply in Silkwood,
was interpreted as only allowing the victim to be compensated; 2) punitive damages' function as
a deterrent; 3) this deterrent effect amounts to state regulation; and 4) the Northern States
decision specifically precludes such state regulation. See Silkwood, slip op. at 26-30.
193
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Commencing its preemption discussion, the Silkwood court noted
that the purpose of the Price-Anderson Act19 6 was to compensate
victims of a nuclear incident. 9 7 It then inferred that Price-Anderson
limits plaintiffs to compensatory damages only,'19 and stated that the
Act is only applicable when an ENO occurs. 99 Thus, one is left
confused as to what damages should be available when an accident
falls short of an ENO as in Silkwood.2 00 Moreover, in its preemptive
dialogue, the court appears to guide the reader to the conclusion that
only compensatory damages are recoverable for injuries sustained due
to any type of nuclear incident. 20 This result is antithetical to the
legislative history of Price-Anderson. 20 2 The failure to further discuss
congressional intent that Price-Anderson not interfere with the application of traditional state tort law principles, absent an ENO, is a
20 3
major shortcoming in the court's analysis.
In reviewing the relevant legislative background of Price-Anderson, emphasis again must be focused on the distinction between regulations governing the operation of an industry and a remedial plan
correcting any wrong committed against an injured party.20 4 PriceAnderson concentrates on the latter. 20 5 The Legislature, when reviewing Price-Anderson, was concerned with the question of the appropri20 6
ate tort law to apply upon the occurrence of a nuclear incident.
Rejecting the need for a federal tort law, a plan was devised which
provided for the waiver of key defenses if the accident is classified as
an ENO.20 7 Otherwise, the forum state's "traditional rules of tort
law ' 208 are to apply. It appears that the underlying goal, therefore,
during the promulgation of Price-Anderson and the amendments

196

Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp.

III 1979)).
,17Silkwood, slip op. at 26-27.
' Id.
199 Id.
"I" See id. at 24.
211 See id. at 26-30.

202See infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
"I See infra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
204See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
20- See Comment, supra note 3, at 746-47. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy investigating Price-Anderson wanted to assure itself " 'that the public will receive prompt and adequate
financial compensation for any damage resulting from potential nuclear hazards.' " S. REP.,
supra note 157, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3201, 3206.
206 S. REP., supra note 157, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3201,

3206-08.
207 Id. at 10-11, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3201, 3209-10.
201 Id. at 11, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3201, 3211.
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thereto,20 9 was to interfere with state law as little as possible. 2'0 This is

evidenced by the numerous references made throughout the legislature's discussion to the fact that the state tort law should remain
undisturbed.

21 '

Price-Anderson's legislative history is acute to a preemption analysis of traditional tort law remedies which have consistently included
punitive damages under appropriate circumstances.2 1 2 Such an exercise of a state's police power, concerned with the welfare of its citizens,213 is the type of state pursuit which should be given significant
deference.2 1 4 Yet, the court of appeals in Silkwood passed over PriceAnderson, failing to give it the attention it deserves. When dealing
with an injured party's rights, the only section of the AEA addressing
the issue to any meaningful degree, has reserved to the states all their
"traditional rules of tort law.

21 5

The Silkwood court, after briefly touching upon Price-Anderson,
continued its preemptive analysis by accenting the deterrent or punitive effects of exemplary damages. 21 6 It then equated this form of
deterrence with the type of state regulation forbidden by the Northern
States interpretation of the AEA. 21 7 In taking this step, the court
further blurred the necessary regulatory-remedial dichotomy 21 8 without furnishing sufficient information to support its conclusion. As
discussed earlier, the concept equating a punitive damage award with
supra note 156.
S. REP., supra note 157, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
Id. at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

209 See
210
21

3201, 3206.
3201, 3206. "Under . . .Price-

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
NEws

Anderson . . . the claimant's right to recover . . . is left to the tort law of the various

States .... " Id. at 9, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3201, 3209. "[T~he plan
adopted permits the retention of State law with respect to the cause of action and the measure of
damages." Id. at 11, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3201, 3211. "The bill has
been drafted so that minor claims involving nuclear facilities or materials may remain subject to
the traditional rules of tort law." Id. "[S]ituations which are not exceptional . .. can well be
taken care of by the traditional system of tort law." Id. "[I]n the absence of some extraordinary
occurrence . ..traditional concepts should be allowed to prevail."
Absent such a determination [that a nuclear incident can be classified as an ENO], a
claimant would have exactly the same rights that he has today under existing lawincluding, perhaps, benefit of a rule of strict liability if applicable State law so
provides. Thus, this bill in no way provides for deprivation of a claimant's existing
rights.
Id. at 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3201, 3212.
212 Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 53 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Belli, supra note 7, at 4, 5,
23; Comment supra note 3, at 743.
213 See supra note 212.
214 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 196-214 and accompanying text & 208-11 and accompanying text.
216 See Silkwood, slip op. at 27.
217 Id. at 27-28.
218 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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state legislative regulation is far from gaining the widespread acceptance the Silkwood court seems to imply.2 19 Whereas the primary
purpose of awarding punitive damages is to prevent wrongful conduct, it also serves less frequently annunciated purposes. 220 A wholesale bar to the imposition of such damages in the area of nuclear
incidents would, therefore, impinge on areas not justified by the
Silkwood decision. 221 The question still remains as to whether the
deterrent effect of punitive damages has the same regulatory end
feared, and thereby precluded, in Northern States.
Punitive damages in Silkwood were awarded to restrain reckless
or wanton acts which result in a radiation-related injury. 22 2 The
223
award was aimed at punishing the wrongdoers for tortious conduct.
Kerr-McGee's substantial compliance with regulatory standards was
not dispositive on the issue of reasonable care, but was merely a factor
to be considered when assessing liability. 224 Thus the court, by awarding punitive damages, is not judging or commenting on the reasonableness of the regulatory scheme, but is simply applying available
remedial law to the wrong committed, seeking to redress it as effectively as possible. This type of situation did not exist in Northern
States. 225
As previously mentioned, Northern States involved state pollution control regulations which imposed stricter standards than the

21' See

supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
220 See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77, at 275 (1935); W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971); Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27
DRAKE L. REv. 195, 199 (1977-78); Belli, supra note 7, at 5-7. The other purposes are 1) revenge,
2) public justice through a private attorney general concept, 3) compensation where the actual
award is insufficient, and 4) public outrage. Id.
221 The court of appeals in Silkwood determined that the punitive award was only to deter
such future actions. This was implied from the district court judge's instruction to the jury. See
Silkwood, slip op. at 27. Therefore, the influence of a complete ban of punitive damages on the
alternative rationales for their invocation was not considered. See supra note 220.
222 Silkwood, slip op. at 27.
223 Id.; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, No. 79-1894 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981).
224 485 F. Supp. at 572, 577-78. The courts have given substantial compliance the same
weight in cases dealing with aviation and drug regulation. See Schneider v. United States, 188 F.
Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281
A.2d 707 (1971) (both dealing with aviation); Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis, 285 F. Supp. 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), alf'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, 263 F. Supp. 159
(D.S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1969); Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis, 257 F. Supp. 991
(D.N.D. 1966), afJ'd. 411 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1969); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 38
Cal.Rptr. 183 (1964) (all involving drug industry).
225 See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text discussing the rationale behind the holding
in Northern States and supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text discussing the distinction
between regulatory and after-the-fact remedial schemes.
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national law. 226 The distinction between prospective regulation and
after-the-fact remedies must be called to mind. 27 The Federal Government, while promulgating extensive regulations in order to decrease radiation hazards, 228 has failed to provide a complementary
remedial scheme for injuries suffered under the guise of those federal
standards. 22 Clearly, the AEC cannot award damages to the injured
party for tortious acts committed within the scope of the regulatory
plan.2 30 Therefore, since Congress has left the issue of providing available remedies to the states, 23 1 and has failed to express a clear directive
placing limits on this power,23 2 a punitive damage award should be
permitted.
An opposing argument is that such an award does, in fact, have
the type of regulatory influence barred by Northern States, 233 since
exemplary damages will influence the standard of care exercised 234 in
the handling of radioactive materials. This standard, however, is
merely a peripheral concern of the national Government's regulation
of radiation hazards, which primarily focuses on the overall safety of
the public with regard to the construction and operation of nuclear
facilities. 235 The Government did not legislate in the area of reasonable care within its regulatory scheme, thereby leaving this issue to the
application of state tort law. 236 Thus, punitive damage awards do not
touch upon the areas encompassed by the national law, but rather
concern themselves with an area in which Congress has not intricately
23 7
legislated outside of a situation involving an ENO.
Additionally, exemplary damages may indirectly affect the operation of a nuclear plant, but they do so only by requiring those
involved in the industry to act reasonably toward the public. 238 Such

226
227
228

See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
10 C.F.R. §§ 1-199 (1982). See generally E. STASON, S.

ESTEP

& W. PtRacE, ATOMS AND

1059 (1954); Silkwood, slip op. at 29-30.
221 Silkwood. slip op. at 23.
230 Id.
231 See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
232 The clear and unambiguous congressional directive required by the state-directed approach is absent when attempting to impliedly preempt a punitive damage award. See supra
notes 66-101 and accompanying text.
233 See Comment, supra note 3, at 742-43.
THE LAW

234

Id.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (1976); Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1154; Silkwood, slip op. at
16 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
236 See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
237 Silkwood, slip op. at 23.
238 To award punitive damages the wrongdoer must have the requisite state of mind, i.e.,
willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others. See supra note 7.
235
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an award neither undermines nor replaces the federal regulations, but
merely helps ensure diligent compliance. This application of punitive
damages serves to complement one of the purposes of the AEA provisions: to protect the public's health and welfare. 239 Even if such an
award is viewed as conflicting with the national standards by imposing stricter criteria, it is merely peripheral to the areas encompassed
by the federal policy and is, therefore, insufficient grounds upon
which to base a preemptive finding. 240 It also must be noted that the
mere possibility of a conflict and its adverse effects will not justify
241
preemption.
It is, therefore, difficult to picture the overriding conflict between a punitive damage award and the national Government's regulation of radiation hazards as necessitating a preemptive verdict. The
two types of regulation, assuming that punitive damages are so classified, are qualitatively different. 242 Exclusive federal regulation of radiation hazards pursuant to subsections 274(b), (c), and (k) of the 1954
Act involves the safe construction and operation of nuclear facilities
and handling of nuclear materials. 243 This, however, should not be
read to overlap with, and thereby preempt, a state's power to ensure
244
the welfare of its citizens through its judicial process.
CONCLUSION

A simple, concise formula regarding the issue of preemption
cannot be developed, yet it is helpful when conducting a preemptive
analysis to recognize a court's attitude toward the doctrine over a
given time period. Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated a deference toward state interests. This state-directed approach requires
Congress to manifest a clear intent to either exclusively control an area
or to preclude certain types of state involvement in order to invoke the
preemption doctrine. The courts are even more particular, requiring
the clearest declaration by Congress, when a state has exercised its
police power to protect its vital, territorial interests, i.e., the health
and welfare of its citizens. An award of punitive damages'is such a
vital interest and has traditionally played a role in most state remedial
schemes.
239

42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976).

240 See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text discussing the two distinctly different areas

addressed by the federal and state actions.
241 Silkwood, slip op. at 15-16 (Doyle, J., dissenting). See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 136-38 & 226-32 and accompanying text.
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The courts, when confronted with a punitive damage-preemption issue, must distinguish between the regulation of the industry and
the conventional remedies available to the injured parties. Although it
is conceivable that such an award may influence areas under federal
control, its predominant thrust is qualitatively different. Congress has
legislated extensively with respect to radiation hazards, yet it has left
the fashioning of a remedial package for injuries caused by such
materials to the customary principles of state tort law. Viewed in a
light most favorable to a preemptive finding, the existing legislative
directives are ambiguous. The Price-Anderson Act reserves to the
states the right to apply their traditional tort rules, while subsection
274(k) of the 1954 Act precludes state regulation of radioactive hazards. Absent the necessary, clear, and unambivalent declaration of
preemptive intent by the federal government, there exists nothing in
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or its legislative history which impliedly mandates the preemption of a punitive damage award in the
field of nuclear injury.
Edwin A. Zipf

